Bitcoin improvement proposal BIP461 could make covert wallet-secret leakage easier to detect by standardizing how ECDSA (a Bitcoin signature scheme) signatures are produced. Authored by Liam Gilligan, the proposal was merged into the BIPs repository on Sept. 16 and remains marked Draft. Independent compliant signers using the same secret key and message hash should generate identical signatures, creating a benchmark for identifying deviations without requiring a Bitcoin consensus change. The procedure fixes signer choices, including the nonce (a temporary signing value), and limits signatures to 70 bytes in standard DER encoding, excluding Bitcoin's one-byte sighash flag. A mismatch indicates that at least one signer is not following BIP461, although an honest signer using another valid ECDSA procedure could also produce a different result. The comparison cannot identify a malicious device or prove theft, and a matching result confirms only that particular sample. The proposal follows the Dark Skippy disclosure, which showed how corrupted firmware could embed seed material in transaction signatures, though the researchers said they had not observed the technique in the wild in their original disclosure. Dark Skippy demonstrated the technique with Schnorr signing, while BIP461 covers ECDSA; Taproot uses the separate BIP340 Schnorr scheme. A reviewer said test vectors and a reference implementation were needed before the draft could advance to Complete. Its practical value for wallet users depends on compliant implementations, independent comparisons, and careful handling of secret keys.